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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of tne most debilitating problems the Aquino 
administration inherited from the Marcos regime was the massive 
external debt the latter had accumulated. Prior to the February 
uprising, the outstanding foreign debt stood at $26,252 million, 
equivalent to 81.7 percent of Gross National Product. These 
figures increased in 1986 and 1987 before finally declining, 
though slightly, in 1988 to $27,915 and 71.5 percent, 
respectively. Data on the Philippine external debt from 1970-
1988 are shown in Table 1. 
The gravity of the debt problem can be inferred from its 
economic ramifications. In 1986, 18.43 percent of government 
expenditures went to interest payments alone and this figure rose 
to 30.91 percent in 1987 and 33.37 percent in 1988. This 
reflects the fact that much of the external debt has been assumed 
by the government. In terms of actual dollar movements, the 
Philippines experienced a net resource outflow in all three years 
of the Aquino government. This impl ies that total outflows 
consisting of interest and amortization payments exceeded total 
*This is Chapter III of a bigger study entitled "An Assess-
ment of the Performance of the Aquino Government in Selected 
Policy Areas, 1986-1988." 
**Research Fellow, Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies (PIDS). 
Table 1: PHILIPPINE EXTERNAL DEBT 
1970-1988 
Ratio to Ratio to Export of 
Year Level ($M) Nominal GNP (%) Goods and Services (%) 
1970 2297 33.90 174.02 
1971 2393 31.02 170.81 
1972 2732 32. 60 188.02 
1973 2886 27.01 114.30 
1974 3755 25.52 105.51 
1975 4939 31.28 154.30 
1976 6768 37.52 196.46 
1977 8069 38.98 190.49 
1978 10694 44.50 217.84 
1979 13352 45.18 213.43 
1980 17252 48.99 215.38 
1981 20893 54.36 242.43 
1982 24677 62.83 308.31 
1983 24816 72.81 305.16 
1984 25418 80.49 317.05 
1985 • 26252 81.70 331.59 
1986 28256 93.71 327.30 
1987 28649 83.78 310.83 
1988 27915 71.48 261.38 
Source of Basic Data: Central Bank of the Philippines. 
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inflows which include assistance from official creditors, grants 
and concessional loans, and new money from international 
commercial banks. 
It is not too difficult to determine the qualitative effects 
of the consequences of the external debt overhang. The policy of 
the government of automatically including appropriations for 
foreign debt repayment in the national budget is tantamount to 
socializing the external debt. The ,recent demonstrations and 
protests of the public school teachers and the inability of the 
government to meet their demands, only serve to underscore this 
point. The hemorrhage of much needed foreign resources deprives 
the economy of international reserves required to finance 
important programs mostly located in the rural areas. In the 
end, it is the lower income classes who tend to suffer the most. 
To further stress the effects of repaying our external debt, 
we performed some simulations using the latest version of the 
PIDS-NEDA Annual Macroeconometric Model. We assumed that 
interest payments would be constrained to 15 percent of 
merchandise exports in 1986 and 1987. The results for key 
economic variables are presented in Table 2. As expected, a 
reduction in interest payments has an expansionary effect on GNP 
in both years. The latter would even be higher if the decrease 
in the interest component of government expenditures would be 
channeled to productive spending (e.g., higher salaries for 
public school teachers). This is Case 2 in the reported results. 
The general price level, which is modelled by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), also rises mainly because the improved Net Foreign 
Assets (NFA) position of the Central Bank exerts an expansionary 
effect on the money supply. In this simulation exercise we 
assumed that the Central Bank will sterilize 50 percent of the 
increase in NFA. If we increase this percentage in order to 
moderate the increase in prices, there would be a further 
expansion in GNP. Other results that conform to initial 
expectations are the improvement in the Balance-of-Payments and 
the narrowing of the budget deficit. 
II. GOVERNMENT POLICY ON EXTERNAL DEBT 
Shortly after the Aquino administration assumed power, its 
then Economic; Planning Minister advocated for a careful 
evaluation of the debts incurred by the Marcos government with 
the view of repudiating those which were contracted under 
doubtful conditions. This call for selective repudiation as a 
strategy for handling our outstanding debt was effectively ruled 
out when President Aquino vowed to honor all the foreign 
obligations of the Philippines. Some sectors hailed this move as 
a victory for the more conservative members of the Philippine 
debt panel, referring to Central Bank governor Jose Fernandez and 
the late Jaime Ongpin, who was then Minister of Finance. 
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Whatever their personal preferences for particular 
strategies, both groups had essentially the same basic objective 
which was embodied in the 1987-1992 Medium Term Economic Plan and 
its subsequent updates. As explicitly stated in the NEDA five-
year plan: "A growth-oriented debt management strategy will 
continue to be adopted. Efforts shall focus on the reduction in 
net resource transfer to creditors in order that available 
foreign exchange resources are utilized for productive purposes." 
The more complete program for the external sector, however, 
reveals a clear bias towards the more conservative stance in 
dealing with the debt problem. Specifically: 
" Financing arrangements that will insure 
effective reduction of the debt burden will also be 
pursued. These will include multi-year rescheduling 
agreements, and continued negotiations for better terms 
and conditions. Other forms of innovative but market-
dictated debt relief options shall be explored such as 
conversion of debt to grants and debt exchange options 
like debt-for-bond swap similar to the Mexican 
arrangement." 1/ 
Nowhere is there mention of the more confrontational schemes such 
as selective repudiation and a cap on interest payments 
equivalent to a small percentage of exports. 
To this end, the government, mainly through the Central Bank 
and Department of Finance, has pursued several market oriented 
strategies. The bilateral agreements under the Second Round 
Rescheduling with the Paris Club, which cover maturities which 
fell due in January 1987 to August 1988 were completed. For this 
round, the Philippines has restructured around $1.0 billion in 
off icial obligations. Recently the Third Round Rescheduling was 
approved following the accord on the MEP. 
A second set of possible strategies are lumped together and 
termed debt conversion schemes. 2/ These include straight 
buybacks which are purchases by the debtor country of its own 
debt at a discount in the secondary market using current 
resources, exit bonds which are exchanges of debt for new debt 
that is implicitly somewhat senior to the old, and debt-equity 
swaps, which are conversions into direct foreign investment. 
1/ 
Quoted from the updated Medium -Term Development Plan, 
pages 1-13 - 1-14. 2/ 
See Alexander (1987) for a more detailed description of 
the various types of transactions listed under debt conversion. 
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The only option used by the government during the 1986-88 
period was the debt-to-equity conversion program. This' scheme 
was promulgated under Executive Order No. 32 and implemented 
through CB Circular No. 1111 last 4 August 1986. Under this 
program, foreign and resident investors were invited to acquire 
equity claims on selected priority investments in the country 
using funds acquired by redeeming Philippine debt bonds which 
they would have had purchased at a discount in the secondary 
market. The ultimate aim of this plan was to employ efficiently 
the country's limited foreign exchange for domestic utilization 
while gradually reducing the stock of outstanding debt. Data on 
the degree of debt conversion using this scheme is presented in 
Table 3. It is clear from the table that majority of the debt-
equity transactions involved CB papers. 
For reasons to be explained later, the government began to 
slow down the transactions involving debt-to-equity conversions 
that utilized CB papers. Only conversion of private debt papers 
was allowed to continue. However, most private ohligers did not 
have sufficient resources to redeem these obligations not to 
mention the fact that some of them were not willing to prepay 
their debts and share the ownership of their corporations with 
new investors. 
To the credit of our debt panel, it is worth mentioning that 
restrictions were placed on the investments that resulted from 
the debt conversions. Specifically, there would be non-repayment 
of the capital portion within the first three years after the 
investment is made. This prevented the possibility that the 
benefits obtained by the reduction in debt would immediately be 
mitigated by capital repatriations. 
III. ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE ON EXTERNAL DEBT 
Table 4 shows that in spite of the government's efforts to 
reduce net resource transfers, the country still experienced 
increasing net outflows during the period 1986-88. Comparing our 
1987 net outflows with other heavily indebted countries, the 
situation of the Philippines does not appear as severe (Please 
refer to Table 5) . In fact, only Chile had a lower net resource 
transfer. 
However, if we scale down these values by per capita GNP in 
order to obtain a rough affordability index, the picture changes 
drastically. The outflow/per capita GNP ratio for . the 
Philippines is 3.1 which is second only to Brazil's 5.6 with 
Mexico a distant third (at 1.8). It must be noted that the 
Philippines has one of the lower outflows in terms of interest 
payments and that Brazil began working out an agreement with its 
creditors only towards the latter part of 1987. 
Table 3: REPORT ON THE DEBT-EQUITY CONVERSION SCHEME 
AS OF NOVEMBER 1988 
1986 1987 
a/ 
1988 
Total Closed Transactions 
(in US $M) b/ 15.227 266.441 439.728 
CB Debt Papers 
(in US $M) 12.2 248.8 338.4 
Philippine Liabilities to 
Foreign Creditor Banks 
(in US $M) 15356 14824 13488 
a/ As of November 1988. 
b/ Includes the portion which have been temporarily 
invested in CB bills as well as the fresh money. 
Source: Department of Economic Research - Domestic, CB. 
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Table 4: EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE BURDEN/NET RESOURCE TRANSFER 
TO CREDITORS, 1986-1988 
1986 1987 1988 
Debt Service Burden (DSB) 
Total Outflows ($M) 
Amorti zation 
Interest Payments 
Debt Service Ratios (In Percent) 
DSB to Exports of Goods 
DSB to Exports of Goods and 
Services 
DSB to Current Account Receipts 
DSB to GNP 
Total Inflows a/ 
Net Resource Transfer 
Percent of GNP 
2937 3005 2983 
999 1092 942 
1938 1913 2041 
60.6 52.5 42.2 
34.0 32.8 27.9 
32.3 30.8 26.0 
9.6 8.8 7.7 
1710 1169 1039 
1227 1836 1944 
5.6 4.7 5.0 
a/ Include MLT pipeline, IMF purchase and identified new money. 
Source of basic data: Central Bank of the Philippines. 
(Reproduced from page 452, 1988 Philippine Development Report) 
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What these figures imply is that the terms the Philippine 
debt panel obtained out of its negotiations with our creditors 
are comparatively mediocre to those granted to other debtor 
nations. Given that the Philippines has lower interest payments, 
the conclusion one arrives at is that countries like Mexico and 
Argentina were able to secure better arrangements in terms of 
debt rescheduling and new money. 
Between 1986 and 1988, thete was a net reduction of 
Philippine debt obligations to foreign creditor banks equal to 
$1,868 million. It would not be proper to attribute this to the 
debt conversion schemes as amortization payments during the same 
period totalled $2,034 million. What would be more accurate is 
to state that debt-equity swaps altered the structure of external 
liabilities of the Philippines. These transactions reduced the 
quantity of external debt and increased the quantity of foreign-
owned equity on the country's external balance sheet. This 
transformation could have reduced the burden of servicing the 
external liabilities for the following reason. 
In the case of equity investment, service payments or 
repatriations associated with equity investments should be more 
closely correlated with the actual return on real assets in the 
debtor country than scheduled interest and principal payments on 
external debt. This suggests that shifting from debt financing 
to equity financing may incorporate an element of risk sharing 
between debtor countries and their foreign creditors that 
benefits the former. Alexander (1987) contends, however, that 
existing debt contracts already incorporate an important degree 
of risk-sharing. The fact that bank loans to developing 
countries are regularly rescheduled and new loans extended on a 
concerted basis suggest that .the institutional arrangements 
supporting the existing contracts already give debtors some 
flexibility to at least postpone scheduled payments when the 
burden of debt service is high. 
The previous argument should emphasize the fact that 
reliance on 'non-confrontational schemes particularly the debt-
equity swaps gives rise to several potential problems. 3/ Another 
matter relates to the macroeconomic impact of debt-equity 
conversions. 
Since most of the transactions involved Central Bank 
obligations, many of the Philippine debt bonds obtained through 
the secondary loan market were redeemed by issuing new money. It 
is estimated that the total addition to the monetary base for the 
period 1986-1988 due to debt conversions is P9.1 billion (which 
3/ 
Alexander also provides an exhaustive discussion of all 
possible economic issues raised by debt conversions. We will 
analyze only the more relevant ones. 
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is approximately 14 percent of the monetary base). To the extent 
that the economy has problems with absorptive capacity and the 
private sector is slow to respond to the increase in domestic 
demand for real goods, there would be a great deal of upward 
pressure on the price level. If the Central Bank decides to 
counteract the increase in inflation with domestic open market 
operations then interest rates would rise which would then have a 
dampening effect on investment. 
In fact this is actually what transpired. Inflation began 
to rise in 1988 which led the Central Bank to put a hold on debt-
to-equity transactions; and towards the latter part of the year 
the Monetary Authorities began to pursue a high interest rate 
policy by injecting reverse repurchase agreements into the 
financial system. The increase in Central Bank liabilities 
effectively substituted foreign debt with domestic debt. If at 
that time, foreign interest rates adjusted for exchange rate 
devaluation were lower than domestic interest rates, this set of 
Central Bank transactions would have increased the cost of 
serving the government's liabilities in the short run. The net 
result would be an increase in the fiscal deficit. To verify the 
above condition we add a depreciation rate of 3.3 percent to 
world interest rates of about 8.5 percent that prevailed in 1988; 
this gives us 11.8 percent. The latter figure is lower than the 
average interest rate prevailing in the Philippine market at the 
time, which is 15 percent. 
Aside from the macroeconomic impact of debt-equity swaps, 
one must evaluate the incentive debt conversion programs provided 
for net new capital inflows. One reason debt-equity swaps may 
generate new capital inflows is that it allows investors to 
purchase assets in the host country more cheaply than through 
normal means. This may not always be the case, however. In some 
cases debt-equity transactions may simply be the cheapest way to 
finance an investment that would have taken place with or without 
a debt conversion program. Clearly, to the extent that debt 
conversions finance capital inflows that would have taken place 
anyway, the subsidy for conversion is a simple transfer from the 
debtor country to the investor that does not benefit the former. 
This problem of additionality has led Dornbusch (1987) to 
characterize debt-equity swaps as rip-offs. 
In general, it is difficult to tell whether there has been 
additionality, i.e., whether the foreign investments would not 
have taken place without the debt conversion program. Table 
6 shows that foreign direct investment in the Philippines rose 
rapidly during the period 1986-88. Since this was the time that 
debt-equity swaps were introduced in the country, the kneejerk 
reaction would be to attribute the expansion in investments to 
the aforementioned program. However, this trend in investments 
from foreign sources was generally true for the ASEAN region. 
One should also remember that it was at this time that Taiwan 
made big strides in its external investment program. While the 
Table 6: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
IN ASEAN COUNTRIES f 1985-88 a/ 
(US $M) 
1985 1986 1987 1958 
Indonesia 310 258 307 NA 
Singapore 809 479 982 NA 
Malaysia 695 489 575 611 
Thailand 162 261 182 660 
Philippines 12 127 186 936 
a/ Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS), various issues 
b/ First three quarters. 
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evidence against additionality is not conclusive, at least it 
should provide cause for concern even among the most enthusiastic 
supporters of debt conversion programs. 
A similar problem arises if capital outflows from the host 
country are not effectively restricted. In this case the 
conversion subsidy generates an arbitrage opportunity. Investors 
can earn a riskless profit by converting foreign exchange into 
assets in the debtor country at a subsidized rate through a debt 
conversion and then converting the domestic assets back into 
foreign exchange in either the official or parallel exchange 
markets. This is the so-called problem of round-tripping. The 
extent of the latter, however, is much more difficult to measure 
than additionality. 
This analysis of the government policy and programs on the 
debt problem indicates that our present strategy has left much to 
be desired. It is true that we have at least advanced over the 
initial strategy of simply muddling through the problem. 
However, the basic objective of prioritizing growth over debt is 
jeopardized by continued net resource outflows. Furthermore, it 
seems that most of the disadvantages that are attributable to the 
debt conversion programs have materialized. Finally, compared to 
other debtor nations, the Philippines appears to have come up 
with deals that were not as beneficial. 
The last point can be substantiated by tracing the track 
record of the Philippine negotiating panel. In 1985, the year in 
which the Baker plan was first announced, the Philippines was 
able to come up with a deal that provided for rescheduling but 
without much new money (about $925 million over a three year 
period). This was quite disappointing as international 
commercial banks at that time promised to allocate $20 billion to 
cash-strapped indebted countries over a three year period not to 
mention the fact that as early as 1982 countries like Mexico, 
Brazil, and Argentina were infused with heavy doses of new money. 
Then in 1986, the Philippines embarked on the debt-equity swap 
program, a development the importance of which was attenuated by 
the fact that this option for debt reduction had been in use as 
early as 1984. 
In 1987, Bolivia was able to secure a deal with its 
commercial bank creditors that involved straight buybacks; in the 
same year Mexico adopted an exit-bond program. 4/ As for the 
Philippines, the best it could do during that year was to extend 
its debt-equity swap program. Hence it is not really surprising 
that the Philippines adopted the direct buyback scheme only 
1/ 
The reader could refer to Lamdany (19,89) for a detailed 
description and comparison of these agreements. 
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recently (August 1989) and at a time when Mexico decided to 
continue with its exit-bond,scheme which casts doubt over the 
optimality of tne former strategy. 
Clearly, there has been a lag on tne part of the Philippine 
debt panel in negotiating for the best possible deal compared to 
other countries. This is one reason why at one time the 
approach of the Fernandez-Ongpin tandem was described as 
"gutless" and "unimaginative" by a -group of professors from the 
U.P. School of Economics. 5/ 
IV. OPTIMAL VOLUNTARY DEBT REDUCTION SCHEMES 
The issue of obtaining the best possible deal could be 
further clarified by analyzing the various schemes that have 
evolved. In a recent article, DiLeo and Remolona (1989) show 
analytically that even without incentive effects on the debtor 
country from debt reduction, creditor banks will gain from debt-
equity swaps, including the banks riot directly involved in the 
transactions, while "the debtor country may or may not gain. This 
arises because greater demand for a country's debt paper will 
cause the market price (discount rate) to increase, benefitting 
the creditor banks. If the actual discount rate rises above the 
debtor country's perceived probability of repayment, then the 
country will stand to lose. In contrast, the debtor country will 
gain from exit-bond exchanges, while the banks may or may not 
gain. If this is the case, one wonders why exit-bonds were not 
included in the menu-of-options agreed upon in 1987. 
In another recent paper, Froot (1989) compares direct 
buybacks, exit bonds, and outright debt relief. The idea behind 
his paper is to identify which schemes will be optimal for 
creditors and which ones will be preferred by debtors. Using an 
intertemporal welfare maximizing framework, he arrives at the 
following conclusions: 6/ 
1) Market-based debt relief schemes are similar 
to pure debt relief in the sense that they reduce the 
debt overhang. These plans can therefore be Pareto 
improving only if investment-incentive effects are 
sufficiently important. 
5/ 
See Alonzo, et al. (1988). The length of time needed to 
conclude the recent negotiations seems to support this character-
ization. A local newspaper carrying a story from Reuter reported 
that "veterans of the three-month-long negotiations with Mexico 
that yielded an agreement on July 23 said they were impressed by 
the speed and ease of the Philippine talks" (which lasted one 
week). Please refer to the Manila Bulletin, 17 August 1989, p. 1. 
6 / 
Please refer to pages 67-68 of his article. 
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2) Market-based plans differ from pure debt 
relief, and from one another, according to the source 
of resources used to retire old debt. Creditors' 
preferred market-based scheme is a buyback out of aid, 
followed either a buyback out of current resources or 
(if the country is on the back side of the Laffer 
curve) a buyback out of future receipts. Debtor's 
preferred scheme is a tie between a buyback out of aid 
and a buyback out of future receipts (an exit bond). 
3) If investment-incentive effects are important 
enough to make debt reduction profitable for creditors, 
then debt reduction alone will not generally be optimal 
from the creditor's perspective. Thus neither market-
based schemes nor pure debt relief will generally 
maximize the value of creditor claims. 
4) In general, countries that are liquidity-
constrained are the best candidates for an optimal 
relief package which includes new lending as well as 
partial debt forgiveness. 
The more important assertion is contained in (2) where it is 
stated that a debtor country should be indifferent to a direct 
buyback out of aid and an exit bond (which is equivalent to a 
direct buyback out of future resources). What would make: them 
differ would be the actual terms that would have been negotiated 
if a particular strategy was followed. In this light the current 
(October 1989) debate between former Secretary of Economic 
Planning Solita Monsod and Social Security System President Jose 
Cuisia, Jr. could be considered moot. 7/ 
Based on newspaper reports, however, it would seem that the 
scheme agreed upon with creditor banks is a direct buyback using 
funds that are not completely additional. In other words, aside 
from utilizing the funds extended by the IMF, World Bank, and the 
Japan Eximbank, the government has to dip into its current 
resources (e.g., its international reserves and ESF funds) in 
order to carry out its buyback program. It also has to be 
ascertained whether or not these funds from the aforementioned 
institutions would have been made available with'or without the 
buyback scheme. Alexander argues that it is not obvious that 
repurchasing one's own debt at a discount makes one better-off. 
V 
Their arguments and counter-arguments were reported in 
various dailies during the latter half of October. Monsod makes 
the point, however, that as a whole the debt package negotiated 
with the commercial bank creditors was insufficient as it did not 
provide enough new money to close the financing gap which is 
necessary in order to be able to attain our targets on growth, 
inflation, and employment. 
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If a debtor is credit constrained, then a repurchase of debt at a 
small discount may make a debtor worse-off. Alexander then 
provides an intuitive proof, thus: 8/ 
"...Another way to look at this issue is to consider 
whether debt repurchase is the highest valued use for 
scarce foreign exchange. One should consider whether 
the debtors might benefit more by using the implicit 
foreign exchange inflow inherent in debt swaps for 
another purpose. If the only alternative use for the 
foreign exchange is scheduled amortization, payments of 
outstanding debt (or a reduction in the amouwt of new 
lending) then clearly repurchasing debt at a discount 
is the highest valued use for the additional foreign 
exchange. But if the foreign exchange can be used to 
finance an increase in imports, or for some other use, 
then it is not clear that debt repurchases is the best 
use for the foreign exchange that is implicitly raised 
by these programs." 
In this respect, the buyback operation would be inferior to a 
scheme which involves exit bonds since use of our current foreign 
exchange resources to retire our debt would entail enormous 
opportunity costs. 
In the case of Froot's analysis, he misses a crucial point. 
If the probability of pure debt relief is positive and increasing 
over time, exit bonds would be a superior strategy for debt 
reduction from the perspective of debtor countries. It is then 
left to determine whether this condition is valid. 
When asked during his campaign how he will address the 
problem of Third World Debt, George Bush emphasized that he would 
adhere to the principles of the Baker plan. Then less than a 
year after he became U.S. president, the Brady plan was 
formulated which for the first time acknowledged the need for 
debt relief. Recently Eduard Shevardnadze, the U.S.S.R. foreign 
minister called for a new deal for developing countries which 
should include massive debt relief. These developments are 
indicati ve of the fact that developed countries are beginning to 
realize the bleak situation of developing countries that are 
mired in debt, making debt forgiveness a very distinct 
possibility in the future. 
6/ 
See pages 32-33 of his article. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It would be difficult to lay the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of the Philippine debt panel for the slow progress in 
solving the external debt problem. Since there is an obvious 
lack of transparency in the negotiating process, one cannot judge 
the performance of Fernandez, Jayme, et al. It may be that 
international creditor banks are simply intransigent and 
inflexible especially since the Philippines has little leverage 
because of the relatively small size of its debt (that is, 
compared to Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina). Moreover, the 
bargaining position of the Philippine debt panel is hampered by 
the existence of cross-conditionalities in the negotiating 
process. In this set-up, the IMF will not honor any agreement 
with the Philippine government unless the latter has come to 
terms with international creditor banks, and vice-versa. Under 
this arrangement, the Philippine government is effectively 
dealing with a creditor cartel. 
Our debt panel, however, could be criticized for meekly 
accepting the configuration of the debt negotiation process. 
They could at least be vocal about this unfair arrangement. In 
addition, it is not a good strategy, not to mention unrealistic, 
to insist that the Philippines could grow out of its external 
debt problem once the proper market-based schemes are implemented 
and necessary reforms in the economy are instituted. They 
should comprehend the fact that the Philippine economy grew 
during the past three years not because of the non-
confrontational approach they adopted, but rather in spite of it. 
If one tries to measure the success of the various market 
oriented strategies it would become apparent that their effects 
are quantitatively small. DiLeo and Remolona estimate that out 
of the $23 bill ion in . face amounts of LDC debt conversions since 
1981, there has been a reduction of only about $8.5 billion in 
foreign liabilities. In the case of the Philippines,' the 
potential $750 million net reduction in our external debt 
resulting from the buyback operations is only a paltry 2.7 
percent of our outstanding foreign obligations. 
Lawrence Klein (1987), a Nobel laureate in Economics, puts 
it more succinctly when he states that it should be recognized 
that there is no automatic growing out of the debt problem and 
that all the clever/worthy proposals cannot do the job. This has 
also been stressed by Sachs (1989) in his most recent article on 
the debt problem. Both Klein and Sachs have proposed more 
fundamental measures to deal with the debt problem with the 
former advocating for an international conference that would 
involve both creditors and debtors simultaneously while the 
latter proposes relief for interest payments, in addition to 
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reduction in principal. In addition Sachs outlines measures to 
minimize the free rider problem on the part of creditor banks. 9/ 
It would seem that some members of the Legislature are aware 
of the futility of market based options as there have been 
efforts to come up with more practical growth-oriented programs 
to manage the external debt problem. Senate Bill 535 seeks to 
limit the amount of debt service, with interest payments being 
constrained to 15 percent of total exports. On the other hand, 
Senate Bill 702 seeks to limit the applicability of the automatic 
appropriation clause only to foreign loans contracted by the 
current administration. While these proposed bills have good 
intentions, so far they remain as proposals. And it is expected 
that these bills will receive stiff opposition from the present 
debt panel. 
However, the present debt panel need not necessarily 
subscribe to these confrontational schemes. At this point in 
time it would be a major step on their part to recognize the 
inadequacy of the current programs to arrive at a growth-oriented 
debt policy. Hopefully this would encourage them to devise 
schemes that would eliminate net outflows and motivate them to 
adopt a tougher stance at the negotiating table. Later on, this 
attitude would prepare them to join the bandwagon of policymakers 
and economists worldwide clamoring for meaningful debt 
forgiveness. 
9/ 
It goes without saying, that the more the views : of 
economists like Sachs and Klein gain prominence; the higher is the 
likelihood of outright debt forgiveness and the greater is the 
preference that should be given to debt-bond swaps over direct 
buybacks. 
19 
REFERENCES 
"Agreement Reported on RP Foreign Debt,". Manila Bulletin, 200, 
No. 17 (17 August 1989) . 
Alexander, L. S. "Debt Conversions: Economic Issues for Heavily-
Indebted Developing Countries." International Finance 
Discussion Papers, No. 315 (November 1987). 
Alonzo, R. et al. "An Alternative Debt Strategy for Our 
Negotiating Team." Philippine Free Press, 3 September 1988. 
DiLeo, P. and E. M. Remolona. "Voluntary Conversions of LDC 
Debt." Federal Reserve Bank of New York, photocopied (March 
1989). 
Dornbusch, R. "The Debt Crisis: Where it. Started, How it Has 
Been and Where it is Today." PIPS Development Research 
News, V, no. 2 (March-April 1987). 
Froot, K. A. "Buybacks, Exit Bonds, and the Optimality of Debt 
and Liquidity Relief." International Economic Review 30, 
No. 1 (February 1989). 
Klein, L. "International Debt of Developing Countries — Any 
Step Towards Solution?" PIPS Journal of Philippine 
Development XIV, No.1 (First Semester 1987). 
Lamdany, R. "Voluntary Pebt Reducti on Operations: Bolivia, 
Mexico, and Beyond." Contemporary Policy Issues, 7 (April 
1989) . 
National Economic Development Authority. Updates on the Medium 
Term Philippine Development Plan,1988-1992 (July 1988). 
Sachs, J. "Making the Brady Plan Work." Foreign Affairs (Summer 
1989). 
List of PIDS Working Papers Comprising the Study on 
"An Assessment of the Performance of the Aquino Government 
in Selected Policy Areas, 1986-1988" 
WP No. 90-02 An Assessment of the Performance of the Aquino 
Government in Selected Policy Areas, 1986-1988: An 
Overview and Summary -
by Erlinda M. Medalla 
WP No. 90-03 An Assessment of Public Administration Under the 
Aquino Administration, 1986-1988 
by Ledivina V. Carino 
WP No. 90-04 An Assessment of the External Debt Management in 
the Philippines, 1986-1988 
by Josef T. Yap 
WP No. 90-05 An Assessment of Policies Affecting the Financial 
Sector, 1986-1988 
by Mario B. Lamberte and Julius P. Relampagos 
WP No. 90-06 An Assessment of Fiscal Policy in the Philippines, 
1986-1988 
by Rosario G. Manasan 
WP No. 90-07 An Assessment of Trade and Industrial Policy, 
1986-1988 
by Erlinda M. Medalla 
WP No. 90-08 A Review of Natural Resource and Environmental 
Management, 1986-1988 
by Marian S. delos Angeles and Noela Lasmarias 
WP No. 90-09 An Assessment of Labor and Employment Policies in 
the Philippines, 1986-1988 
by Edna A. Reyes and Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez 
WP No. 90-10 An Assessment of Population, Health and Education 
Policies in the Philippines, 1986-1988 
by Alejandro N. Herrin 
WP No. 90-11 A Review of the 1986 Reform of the Individual 
Income Tax 
by Rosario G. Manasan 
WP No. 90-12 An Analysis of the Value Added Tax in the 
Philippines 
by Rosario G. Manasan 
